Naval War College Review
Volume 64
Number 4 Autumn

Article 15

2011

The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of
Afghanistan
Jeffrey J. Winters
Bing West

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Winters, Jeffrey J. and West, Bing (2011) "The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan," Naval War College Review:
Vol. 64 : No. 4 , Article 15.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss4/15

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

150

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Winters
and West: The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan

weapon useless if precise operating procedures are not followed. Regarding concern over terrorists building their own
bombs, it is very hard to steal fissile material, and the work of constructing a
bomb is “difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting.” A great deal of complex experimentation, experimentation
beyond the capabilities of substate
groups, would be required.
Mueller points to a raft of alarming but
mistaken predictions about the likelihood of a terrorist group using a nuclear
weapon. For example, John Negroponte,
as UN ambassador (2001–2004), suggested that there was a “high probability” that al-Qa‘ida would attempt to use
a nuclear weapon on the United States
within two years—an ominous warning
offered in 2003.
Those concerned by the threat of nuclear terrorism against the United States
are likely to find Atomic Obsession a well
argued, engagingly written, thoughtprovoking, and ultimately reassuring
work.
ANDREW L. STIGLER

Naval War College

West, Bing. The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and
the Way Out of Afghanistan. New York: Random
House, 2011. 336pp. $28

“We have fought the wrong war with
the wrong strategy”—so ends Bing
West’s The Wrong War. West, a former
assistant secretary of defense and Marine officer with combat experience in
Vietnam, is an award-winning author
whose books have appeared on the New
York Times best-seller list and the Commandant of the Marine Corps’s reading
list. His latest work is an engrossing
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compilation of tactical vignettes, cataloging changes to the strategic and
operational-level approaches of two
administrations and six theater-level
commanders, over the ten-year history
of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
West’s concluding view on the key to
exiting Afghanistan, though perhaps an
oversimplification of the challenge, is
nonetheless a valid consideration for a
potentially long-term military commitment in Afghanistan.
The strength of West’s work is in his
vivid descriptions of operations undertaken by coalition and special operations forces (SOF) in Kunar and
Helmand Provinces. The author’s credibility and ability to connect with war
fighters provide him intimate access to
small-unit leaders, resulting in narratives of tactical-level successes that ultimately evolved into strategic-level
failures. West also describes the complexities of the regional, tribal, and
national-level political influences in Afghanistan, the latter best illustrated by
operations in Nuristan Province forced
upon the coalition by President Hamid
Karzai. There are also numerous examples of what West describes as the “culture of entitlement,” whereby Afghan
leaders gain the benefits of coalitionprovided security and development
projects while seemingly providing—at
best—only neutrality in return. West’s
portrayals of the war fighters’ courage
and heartbreak are well supported by a
number of revealing photographs. His
method of numbering the photos for
specific reference in the text is particularly effective. Aside from some minor
editorial errors, this work is remarkably
detailed yet still easy to follow, despite
the change over time in local leadership, unit rotation, and the periodic
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renaming of forward operating bases
and combat outposts.
The proposed way out of Afghanistan is
offered in rather abrupt fashion in the
final chapter of the book. West’s examples and repeated references to Vietnamera Combined Action Platoons and his
comparisons of them to effective
SOF-led forces in Helmand are indeed
well founded. However, as painstakingly as he describes the regionally
compartmentalized long-term failure of
small units in one region, caution is
warranted in prescribing one district’s
successful approach as a theater-wide
solution. Furthermore, while West
identifies the challenges, his solution
does not address the broader problems
of the narcotics trade, district-level corruption, and the synchronization of
incentives-based development programs
—all of which must be addressed while
simultaneously balancing an “exit”
strategy with mid to long-term advisory
force structures. Also noticeably absent
is the inclusion of a chapter on the P2K
(Paktia/Paktika/Khowst) region and the
Haqqani network insurgent group.
The Wrong War will undoubtedly be a
popular read among junior leaders and
war fighters, as well as the general readership, and it should be considered for
battalion-level reading lists and predeployment cultural-awareness training.
Nevertheless, and while the lessons of
Kunar and Helmand are certainly relevant and West’s advisory-team structure is well considered, policy makers
and strategists will find the book lacking sufficient depth in addressing the
broader-based challenges for a longterm, comprehensive solution.

Evans, Thomas W. The Education of Ronald Reagan: The General Electric Years and the Untold
Story of His Conversion to Conservatism. New
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2006. 302pp. $20

Thomas Evans is the first author to examine comprehensively Ronald Reagan’s eight years (1954–62) as host of
the television show General Electric Theater and then as a traveling spokesman
for General Electric. Evans has deepened our understanding of how a devoted “New Dealer” became not only a
champion of Barry Goldwater but then
displaced him as the patron saint of
American conservatism. Evans’s fine
book examines a critical period in Reagan’s life during which his skills as a
public figure blossomed. Reagan was
one of our most ideological presidents,
yet at the same time he considered himself a master of the art of negotiation
and frequently compromised with political opponents in Sacramento and
Washington. As Reagan developed his
negotiating skills as president of the
Screen Actors Guild (1947–52), he saw
the other side of midcentury American
labor strife, from the perspective of
management, during his time with GE.
General Electric was a formidable and
respected union adversary in terms of
countering big labor’s demands; the
company poured considerable resources
into “educating” its workers to reject
union radicalism. GE’s management
was also ahead of its time in communicating directly with its labor force, over
the heads of the union leadership—a
tactic Reagan employed to great effect
in the White House when Congress
stood in his way.
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At the same time, Reagan also learned
to “work a room”—meeting GE
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